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Abstract
In the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, agents play with each other and
update their strategies in every generation according to some microscopic dynamical
rule. In its spatial version, agents do not play with every other but, instead, interact
only with their neighbors, thus mimicking the existing of a social or contact net-
work that defines who interacts with whom. In this work, we explore evolutionary,
spatial PD systems consisting of two types of agents, each with a certain update (re-
production, learning) rule. We investigate two different scenarios: in the first case,
update rules remain fixed for the entire evolution of the system; in the second case,
agents update both strategy and update rule in every generation. We show that in
a well-mixed population the evolutionary outcome is always full defection. We sub-
sequently focus on two-strategy competition with nearest-neighbor interactions on
the contact network and synchronized update of strategies. Our results show that,
for an important range of the parameters of the game, the final state of the system
is largely different from that arising from the usual setup of a single, fixed dynami-
cal rule. Furthermore, the results are also very different if update rules are fixed or
evolve with the strategies. In these respect, we have studied representative update
rules, finding that some of them may become extinct while others prevail. We de-
scribe the new and rich variety of final outcomes that arise from this co-evolutionary
dynamics. We include examples of other neighborhoods and asynchronous updat-
ing that confirm the robustness of our conclusions. Our results pave the way to an
evolutionary rationale for modelling social interactions through game theory with a
preferred set of update rules.
Key words: Game theory, evolution, prisoner’s dilemma, learning, emergence of
cooperation.
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1 Introduction
The quest for the origins of the cooperative behavior observed in nature, in
many different species or at different biological levels, from molecules to in-
dividuals, is an exciting project that has received much attention in the last
decades [Darwin, 1871; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Maynard-Smith and Szathma´ry,
1995; Hammerstein, 2003]. Evolutionary game theory has been one of the most
successful frameworks to address this issue in a quantitative manner [Gintis,
2000; Nowak, 2006b; Pennisi, 2005] and by allowing a stylization of the main
strategic interactions and social dilemmas, has provided many insights into
the reasons of the emergence of cooperation.
A particularly fruitful line of research has focused on the interactions between
two individuals, trying to explain cooperative behaviors in a population with
a bottom-up approach. In this context, interactions are modelled by means of
2x2 games, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma [Rapoport and Chammah, 1965]
or the Hawk-Dove game [Maynard-Smith, 1982]. These games have proven
themselves relevant in situations arising in biochemistry [Frick and Schuster,
2003], cooperation between bacteria [Crespi, 2001], mutualistic interactions
[Kiers et al., 2003], fish [Dugatkin and Mesterton-Gibbons, 1996] and, of course,
human societies [Kollock, 1998].
Within the framework of evolutionary game theory, a number of explanations
have been proposed to understand the origin of cooperation [Nowak, 2006a].
In this work, we focus on one of them, namely the existence of a spatial
structure, as such or as a representation of a social network. Indeed, many
studies have pointed out that certain types of spatial structure foster coop-
eration in simple two-player symmetric games, beginning with the pioneering
work by Nowak and May [1992]. Subsequent papers [Nowak and May, 1993;
Hauert, 2002, 2006; Santos et al., 2006a,b; Jime´nez et al., 2008; Lozano et al.,
2008; Garden˜es et al., 2008; Langer et al., 2008] analysed different aspects of
the emergence of cooperation in spatial games and as a conclusion of this
work the general idea that spatial structures supported cooperative behaviors
began to shape up. For a comprehensive summary of all the recent work on
evolutionary game theory on graphs, see the review by Szabo´ and Fa´th [2007].
Recently, some authors have questioned the generality of the above assertion,
at least as far as other games are concerned. Thus, Hauert and Doebeli [2004]
and Sysi-Aho et al. [2005] have shown that spatial structure may decrease the
cooperation level attained in the Hawk-Dove game as compared to that ob-
served in a well-mixed population. Following this result, some researchers have
looked in detail into the different reports and found that the phenomenon of
the emergence of cooperation, when truly existing, turns out to be dependent
on the microscopic update rules used in the simulation. In other words, it
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is possible that within the same game, played in the same spatial structure,
cooperation arises or not depending on the way the players change their strat-
egy during evolution. This is the case, for instance, when playing Prisoner’s
Dilemma on a square lattice: whereas unconditional imitation (see below for a
description of this and the rest of update rules studied in this paper) gives rise
to cooperation [Nowak and May, 1992], replicator dynamics leads to full de-
fection [Roca et al., 2008]. Similar dependences of the results for other update
dyamics have been reported by Ohtsuki and Nowak [2006] for death-birth,
birth-death and imitation.
In view of this situation, in this paper we aim to going beyond the approach
that has been traditionally used in the study of spatial games. Specifically, we
intend to provide an evolutionary rationale for choosing a particular update
rule in the implementation of spatial models of cooperation. To this end,
we will allow agents to update not only their strategies but also the update
rule itself. The outcome of these simulations will show whether or not all
update rules are equally likely to appear in a structured population and, if not,
which ones are evolutionarily selected. One can then compare this conclusion
to the scenarios of emergence of cooperation on networks and discuss the
applicability of the different results already known. Indeed, the fact that rules
favoring cooperation were evolutionarily favored would support the mechanism
of network reciprocity as one of the most important ones for the emergence
of cooperation. On the contrary, if the competition among update rules leads
to the survival only of those that do not support cooperation, it would be
difficult to argue that networks promote cooperation.
For the present study, we will be concerned only with the problem of one-
shot or memoryless Prisoner’s Dilemma, as has been generally studied in the
context of evolutionary game theory on graphs; rules for deciding the action
to be taken next on the basis of previous ones, such as tit-for-tat, Pavlovian
strategies, stochastic reactive strategies, etc. Although it is possible to think of
these strategies as C or D strategists with a learning rule, their use of memory
place them in a different class that and will not be considered here. On the
other hand, we here focus on a typical set of local rules, as considered, for
instance in Hauert [2002]; it is clear that this kind of evolutionary competition
may extend to many other update dynamics but an exhaustive analysis of
every possible rule is beyond the scope of the present research, that intends
only to assess the relevance of such an evolutionary process.
In this paper we address the co-evolution of strategies and update rules in a
three-step process. As a preliminary result, we discuss the case of well-mixed
populations and show by an example that in this situation including evolving
update rules does not change the well-known outcome, namely that defection
prevails. Then we move to the case in which the population interaction is
governed by a lattice, as a specific example of social network in which it is
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easier to interpret the results. In order to have a reference, a first step in
our approach is the comparison of mixed systems, consisting of agents with
different (but fixed during evolution) update rules, with the emergence of
cooperation in pure single-dynamics systems. Already at this stage we find
differences between the two scenarios which are worth describing; on the other
hand, this is a necessary reference frame to understand the subsequent results
of co-evolution. Indeed, after this first step, we proceed to let update rules
evolve along with strategies. In this situation, we find new results that differ
both from the single-rule case and from the mixed-rule case. We will describe
the results of our simulations and in the conclusions we summarize our findings
and discuss their implications for the emergence of cooperation.
2 Model
Our model is based on the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game [Rapoport and Chammah,
1965]. An archetype in game theory, the PD game belongs to a general class of
symmetric games that consist of two players or agents that confront, each with
a definite strategy: either to cooperate or to defect with the opposite player.
Each combination of strategies between the players has an associated payoff,
and hence there are four possible outcomes: if the player cooperates, the as-
sociated payoff she gets is S if the other player chooses to defect, or R > S, if
the other player reciprocates the cooperation. On the other hand, if the first
agent defects, her payoff is P , if the other also defects, or T > P , if the other
cooperates. The PD corresponds to any choice of payoffs ordered according to
T > R > P > S. It is customary to assume that 2R > T + S to avoid that
players take turns at defecting and win a larger payoff than the one they would
have just cooperating. We will stick to this constraint although in our case
we deal with one-shot, non-repeated games because strategies and payoffs are
updated after every single game, and hence strictly speaking we need not im-
pose this condition. In the rest of this work, we will adopt the commonly-used
rescaled payoff T = b, R = 1, and P = S = 0 [Nowak and May, 1992]. This
does not affect the general essence of the game, and reduces the study to just
one free parameter, usually called the temptation parameter. Nevertheless, we
checked the robustness of our simulations by comparing some cases with the
choice S = −0.2, finding very approximately the same results.
In the evolutionary version of the PD game, N agents play between them, and
after every instance of the game they decide whether to change strategies or
not according to some microscopic update rule. In a well-mixed situation, each
player plays every other once and afterwards they proceed to the update stage.
In our case, as we are interested in the rules that can promote cooperation in a
spatially structured population, the players are located at the nodes of a square
lattice, where each agent is connected with her four closest neighbors and plays
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the game only with those neighbors. The reason we have chosen a square
lattice is that it is a well studied model [Nowak and May, 1992; Hauert, 2002;
Roca et al., 2008; Langer et al., 2008] in the single-update rule framework, and
therefore we can compare our results to those previous works. The sequence
of steps for the simulation is as follows: Each player is assigned, randomly
and with equal probability, an initial strategy of cooperation (C) or defection
(D), and a payoff, initially set to zero. In each generation, all agents play PD
once with each neighbour, with an associated payoff for each game, collecting
a total final payoff for each player. After each generation, all agents update
their strategies simultaneously, according to a certain update rule (defined
separately), that may depend on the agent’s payoff and her neighbour’s, and
that defines the dynamics of the game. Once defined, for all players, what the
strategy for the next generation will be, all payoffs are reset to zero and the
cycle starts over.
As we have said, the new ingredient of our model is twofold: two different up-
date rules and the possibility that the update rules themselves evolve. There-
fore, in our model players may be set to have rule A or rule B, where A and
B stand for specific dynamical rules that will be explained below. In this way,
each player has its own individual dynamical rule. Within this framework, we
devised two possible alternatives. In the first case, agents are assigned their
dynamical rule, that remains fixed for the rest of the simulation. In the second
case, agents may change their dynamical rule during the game according to a
simple criterion: an agent copies the dynamical rule from its neighbour when-
ever it copies its strategy. This can be interpreted as a complete replacement
of one agent for another agent’s offspring, which may be convenient or use-
ful in certain descriptions. This interpretation is suitable for both biological
and sociological situations, in this last case in terms of culture transmission
and learning. Furthermore, the possibility of variable update rules implies an
evolution (and therefore a competition) of the rules themselves. If as a conse-
quence of this evolution one rule, or a restricted set of rules, are selected, the
results on the emergence of cooperation on lattices will have to be revisited
again in the light of our findings.
We implement three of the most representative, and most commonly con-
sidered, dynamical rules: the unconditional imitation (UI, a.k.a. as imitate-
the-best) rule, the Moran (MOR) rule and the replicator (REP) rule. Un-
conditional imitation is a completely deterministic rule: at the end of each
generation, an agent simply adopts the strategy of her neighbour with the
highest payoff (i.e., the most successful one), given that this neighbour has a
greater payoff. Note also that this rule checks the payoff of all the neighbors
of the agent whose strategy is to be updated. In this sense we will refer to
this strategy as global (not to be confused with global in terms of the whole
lattice). In the replicator dynamics, an agent randomly chooses another agent
(in our case, one of its four neighbours) and, if the chosen agent has a higher
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payoff, the original one adopts that neighbour’s strategy with a probability
proportional to the difference of payoffs between the two. In this case, we are
faced with a local update rule, that does not look at all the updating agent’s
neighbourhood. Another important remark is that, in our model, an agent
having an imitation or replicator rule will never adopt another strategy (or
rule) that performed worse. Finally, in a Moran process, the agent, at the end
of each generation, evaluates a set of probabilities, one for each neighbour and
proportional to that neighbour’s payoff. Then the agent randomly selects a
neighbour’s strategy according to that set of probabilities. In this case, there
is a possibility that an agent adopts a strategy that performed worse in a
previous round. On the other hand, this is again a global rule, in the same
sense as we referred above to the imitiation one.
3 Well-mixed populations
Before proceeding with the study of the evolutionary competition of learning
rules on lattices, it is important to analyze the case in which every player plays
against every other one, i.e., a well-mixed population. The reason for the need
of such a study is twofold: on one hand, knowing the behavior of a well-mixed
population is necessary in order to assess whether or not changing the scenario
to a lattice has any new effect; on the other hand, the well-mixed population
can be used to understand at least the initial stages of the evolution on a
lattice, when correlations arising because of evolution are not yet important
and the assumption that agents meet an “average” agent can be made. We
note that this assumption is very common in the statistical physics literature
where it is referred to as the mean-field approach (see, e.g., Szabo´ and Fa´th
[2007] and references therein).
For the sake of simplicity, in what follows we will consider the case in which
an initial fraction x of imitator agents, i.e., agents that learn through UI,
compete with an initial fraction 1− x of replicator agents, agents using REP.
The other possible competitions can be treated in much the same way with
similar results, therefore we use this particular choice as an illustration. If
initially a fraction y of agents are cooperators (equally distributed among UI
and REP players), the four types of agents present in the population at time
t = 0 are given by
f 0Ci=xy, (1)
f 0Di=x(1− y), (2)
f 0Cr =(1− x)y, (3)
f 0Dr =(1− x)(1− y), (4)
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where the subindices C or D represent cooperators and defectors, respectively,
and i and r refer to imitators and replicators, also respectively.
Evolution begins by all agents playing the game with all the population. With
our choice of payoffs, cooperators receive a payoff wC = x and defectors receive
a payoff wD = bx. Let us now examine the evolutionary process at the first
step, beginning with cooperators:
Imitator agents: As b > 1, we have wD > wC and therefore all imitator agents
switch to defection at time t = 1, and hence f 1Ci = 0; the newly created defector
will be an imitator with probability x and a replicator with probability (1−x).
Replicator agents: The fate of replicator agents is more complicated and in
particular the evolution of their number in time depends on the form chosen
for the probability to copy the other agent’s strategy. If p is the probability of
a cooperator replicator to switch to defection (the value of p depends on the
payoff difference, which is b(1 − x), and on the normalization), we have the
following scenario: The probability that a replicator chooses a cooperator to
compare her strategy is y (the fraction of cooperators at t = 0); in that case,
the payoffs are the same and she will not change her strategy and update rule.
On the contrary, with probability 1− y she will compare with a defector, and
will turn into a defector herself with probability p. However, this defector will
be an imitator with probability x and a replicator with probability 1− x.
Finally, in view of the payoffs above, defectors never change, irrespective of
their update rule. Collecting all the different contributions, we have at t = 1
f 1
Ci
=0, (5)
f 1
Di
= f 0
Di
+ xf 0
Ci
+ px(1− y)f 0
Cr
, (6)
f 1Cr = [y + (1− p)(1− y)]f
0
Cr = [1− p(1− y)]f
0
Cr, (7)
f 1Dr = f
0
Dr + (1− x)f
0
Ci + p(1− x)(1− y)f
0
Cr. (8)
From Eq. (7) it is clear that the fraction of cooperator agents will steadily
decrease; imitators disappear at the first step and replicators will decrease
exponentially [note that the coefficient in Eq. (7) is smaller than 1]. As a
consequence, asymptotically the population will evolve to full defection. On
the other hand, when all cooperator replicators disappear, it can be shown
straightforwardly that they would have contributed to the two types of defec-
tors simply proportionally to their initial fraction, i.e.,
f∞
Di
= f 0
Di
+ x(f 0
Ci
+ f 0
Cr
) = x(1 − y) + xy = x, (9)
f∞
Dr
= f 0
Dr
+ (1− x)(f 0
Ci
+ f 0
Cr
) = (10)
= (1− x)(1− y) + (1− x)y = (1− x).
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This means that the effect of introducing a lattice as support of the game
has indeed non-trivial consequences because, as will be shown below, there is
cooperation in a wide range of parameters, and the level of cooperation and
the fractions of the different types of strategists and update rules can not be
predicted from the initial fractions in such an straightforward manner.
4 Results on lattices
To study our model, we performed a series of numerical experiments for both
cases, namely with fixed and with variable update rules, for the same set
of game parameters. Each experiment consists in a population of N = 104
agents, spatially arranged in a square lattice. Generally speaking, each agent
is endowed initially with one of two available dynamical rules, A or B (where
A and B stand for UI, MOR or REP), and one of two possible strategies, C
or D. To monitor the evolution of the system we will observe the frequency or
density of a certain type of player, for example those that are cooperators or
those with a certain update rule. Thus, we define fA to be the number of agents
with rule A divided by N , and fC the number of cooperator agents divided
by N . Every experiment is characterised by an initial density of cooperators
fC(t = 0) (or in a simpler notation, fC(0)) and by an initial fraction of agents
with rule A, fA(0). In this way, f
C will generally change. The homogeneous
case (all agents with the same update rule) is recovered by choosing fA(0) = 1.
To simplify the parameter space of our simulations, we only considered initial
strategies assigned randomly and with equal probability, i.e. fC(0) = 0.5 in
all experiments, independent of the update rule considered. All numerical
simulations run for T = 104 generations or time steps, for a given value of
b. Within this duration equilibration was achieved (often much earlier), i.e.,
the densities reached their asymptotic values and remain there within small
fluctuations.
4.1 Fixed update rules
We begin by looking at the simplest case of agents that can have two different
update rules but they cannot change them during evolution. In this case,
fA = fA(0) and remains constant for all times. It is useful to analyse the
normalised fraction of cooperators of, say, rule A, which we will refer to as
µA = f
C
A
/fA, where 0 ≤ µA ≤ 1, so we can better compare systems with
different values if fA(0).
A first finding arising from our experiments is that the initial fraction of the
populations, fA(0) may affect greatly the final cooperator outcome. Consider
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for instance the left panel of Fig. 1, where we show an example of a system with
fixed rules, plotting, for a population of UI and REP, the final (equilibrium)
value of the relative cooperator density µT
UI
and µT
REP
as a function of fUI(0).
We indeed observe that the initial ratio of agent types has a significant effect
on the final outcome of the simulations, although this is not so in the case
of UI (solid line): up to a value fUI(0) ∼ 0.75 of the total initial fraction
fUI(0) the ratio µ
T
UI
of UI cooperators is more or less constant, increasing
slightly for larger values of fUI(0) ∼ 0.75. In the case of REP agents (dashed
line), we get another interesting result: The initial fraction of replicator agents
fREP (0) = 1−fUI(0) is approximately proportional to the amount of replicator
cooperators within the replicator population, µREP being smaller (larger) than
0.5 whenever fREP (0) is smaller (larger) than 0.5. While this may look intuitive,
it must be recalled that when the population consists only of REP agents, the
cooperators die out for any value of the temptation parameter b. Regarding
the time evolution of the experiment, the right panel of Fig. 1 shows two
examples of the evolution of the normalized fraction µUI for different values of
the initial fraction of imitators fUI(0). There is always an initial drop of µUI
and a final relaxation to a value µT that, as stated before, depends on fUI(0).
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1f
UI
(0)
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
µΤ
µT
UIµT
REP
100 101 102 103
t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
µT
1.00
0.75
Fig. 1. Left: Value of µT
UI
(solid) and µT
REP
(dashed) at T = 104 as a function of the
initial frequency of imitators agents fUI(0). Rules are fixed throughout the simula-
tion. Right: Time evolution of the normalised cooperator frequency µUI = f
C
UI
/fUI
in the UI vs. REP game, for b = 1.05 and two values of the initial frequency of
imitators fUI(0).
Having considered the effect of different populations of update rules, let us now
discuss the dependence on the temptation parameter b, and let us compare
the results for the homogeneous case (all agents equal) with the case where
two different rules are present. As a specific example, in Fig. 2 we plot, for
the same game as before, the dependence of the total cooperator density as
a function of the parameter b for the homogeneous case fUI(0) = 1 and for
a mixed case with fixed fUI(0) = 0.75. For the homogeneous case, using the
fact that unconditional imitation is a deterministic rule, one can show that
fUI depends on b in a step-like fashion, changing when b is
4
4
, 4
3
and 3
2
, in
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perfect agreement with the results of our simulations. As we may see from the
plot, this functional dependence changes when there are replicators among the
imitators. We find that the effect of the replicators is to lower the amount of
total cooperators for a the whole range of values of b corresponding to the
PD, e.g. b ≥ 1. In this respect, it is interesting to look at how the fraction of
cooperators changes relative to the population with the same rule. This is also
plotted in Fig. 2, by showing both µUI and µREP as a function of b. We see
that, for 1 < b < 3
2
, even though the total cooperator density is lower than in
the pure UI case, the cooperative imitators are a fraction larger than the total
average, whereas the replicators are less than the average. On the other hand,
for b > 3
2
, defectors take over the entire population, so µUI = µREP = 0. This
means that the level of cooperation attained for a pure UI population in the
PD suffers a considerable decrease or are totally suppressed by the presence
of a minority of REP agents (we have checked with populations as small as
fREP = 0.01 obtaining similar results). We will come back to this issue when
considering different neighborhoods below.
0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
b
0 0
0.2 0.2
0.4 0.4
0.6 0.6
0.8 0.8
1 1f  C f  C ( f
 UI
 (0)=1.00)
f  C ( f
 UI
 (0)=0.75)
µ
 UI ( f
 UI
 (0)=0.75)
µ
 REP
( f
 UI
 (0)=0.75)
µ
Fig. 2. Density of cooperators for the UI vs. REP game with fixed dynamical rules.
In thick solid lines, we present the case of a pure imitator population. In thick
dashed lines, same settings but with fUI(0) = 0.75. In thin solid (dashed) line we
show the normalised density of cooperator imitators (replicators) µ. All quantities
are averages of over 30 realisations.
4.2 Variable dynamical rule
In the previous subsection, we have reported that the presence of two different
update rules in the population may considerably change the behavior of the
PD on a lattice, the general conclusion being that the level of cooperation is
lower than for the pure UI population. This result must be kept in mind when
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analysing the outcome of allowing the update rules themselves to evolve, the
issue which we focus upon in the following. When agents are allowed to switch
their update rule when updating their strategies, then the fraction of agents
of rules A and B, fA, fB, will generally change. Indeed, in this case, we will see
that, for certain values of the game parameters, a rule can completely overtake
the system as the other one disappears, yielding different outcomes than the
ones obtained with fixed update rules, or with just one update rule.
100 101 102 103 104
t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1f  C
f  C
f  C
 UI
f  C
 MOR
100 101 102 103 104
t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1f  C
f  C
f  C
 UI
f  C
 MOR1
Fig. 3. Top panel: The UI vs. MOR game with fixed rules for fUI(0) = 0.12 and
b = 1.20. In solid line, the total cooperator density fC. In thin solid (dashed) line
the imitator (Moran) cooperator density. Bottom panel: same simulation as in top
panel with update rule changing permitted. Lines have the same meaning as in top
panel.
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To begin with, let us present and discuss a specific example: In Fig. 3 we col-
lect the results for the competition between UI agents versus MOR agents. On
the top panel we show the cooperator frequency evolution with fixed update
rules, i.e., when agents cannot change their update rules. We clearly observe
that the total cooperator fraction fC disappears at about t ∼ 300. Note that
both UI and MOR cooperators disappear at about the same time as defec-
tors take over the entire population, in agreement with our conclusion of the
previous subsection that inhomogeneous agents lead to lower levels of coop-
eration. Subsequently, let us consider the bottom panel of Fig. 3, where we
show a simulation under the same conditions with the only difference that
in this case agents also copy their neighbour’s update rule if they copy their
(C or D) strategy. Opposite to the situations with fixed update rules, not
only the total fraction of cooperators does not disappear, but also we find
that cooperators end up forming about three quarters of the total popula-
tion. Interestingly, there is an initial decrease in the cooperation fraction, in
agreement with the predictions of the well-mixed/mean field calculation sum-
marized in Sec. 3 (here REP is replaced by MOR, but the argument is very
similar and applies as well). It’s only at a later stage when the effect of spatial
correlations, namely the formation of clusters of cooperators, enters into play
and leads to an increase of cooperation [Hauert, 2002; Nowak and May, 1992;
Roca et al., 2008]. Analysing the individual rules, we see that MOR coopera-
tors disappear roughly at the same pace (actually, a little faster than in the
fixed rule case), so all cooperators remaining are of the UI type. Remarkably,
UI agents completely replace MOR agents in spite of the fact that the initial
fraction of imitators in this simulation is fUI(0) = 0.12.
We could continue our discussion of specific examples but, to avoid a very
lengthy description, let us only mention that other interesting outcomes may
appear depending on the game parameters and update rule combinations. For
instance, it is possible to see a coexistence of cooperators of one rule with
defectors of the other rule, as occurs for imitators versus Moran agents with
fUI(t = 0) < 0.5 and b = 1.05. However, as we are more interested in general
conclusions than on a detailed classification of all the possible outcomes, we
will switch to a more general viewpoint in what follows.
We will now discuss the dependence of the results on the temptation parameter
b. In fact, as agents are now allowed to change the dynamical rules, both the
fraction of cooperators, fC, and the fraction of agents with rule A, fA, may
change, so it is relevant to ask what is the dependence on the temptation
parameter b for both of these quantities. In Fig. 4 we show, as an example,
our results for the case of UI and MOR agents as a function of b. We see
that depending on the value of b, the interaction affects the final fraction of
cooperators to different extents. Comparing with the homogeneous UI case,
we observe that there is a lower fraction of cooperators for the mixed case
when 1 < b < 1.25 (the second bound is approximate) and for b > 3
2
. On the
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other hand, the mixed case shows more cooperation when b < 1 and in the
interval 1.25 < b < 4
3
. Finally, the two curves coincide for 4
3
< b < 3
2
. The
plot also depicts the final fraction of imitator agents fUI (cf. right axis) for the
mixed case. Indeed, for most values of b, i.e. b < 3
2
, UI agents have increased
their frequency from the initial value fUI(0) = 0.12), even becoming the only
rule (fUI = 1) for certain regions (b < 1 and 1.25 < b <
3
2
). Note that, for the
cases b < 1 and 1.25 < b < 4
3
, the presence of Moran agents at early stages of
the evolution makes the equilibrium state to have more cooperation than the
homogeneous UI case, even though Moran agents finally dissapear completely.
This constrasts with the case 4
3
< b < 3
2
, where the cooperator frequency is
the same as in the homogeneous case.
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Fig. 4. Density of cooperators fC and density of imitators fUI as a function of the
temptation parameter b, for the UI vs. MOR game. Simulation time is T = 104. In
thick solid line, we show fC for the case of a population composed by imitators only.
In dashed line, we present the same quantity for a mixed system with fUI(0) = 0.12.
In thin solid line, the final fraction of imitators (both cooperators and defectors).
All quantities are averages of over 30 realisations.
5 Extensions
5.1 Moore neighborhood
The results in Subsec. 4.1 are an indication that conclusions such as the pro-
motion of cooperation on the PD on lattices found by Nowak and May [1992]
may not be robust against the presence of other types of update strategists,
and therefore that their applicability must be studied depending on the way
individual agents behave. However, those results have been obtained under the
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restriction that players interact only with their nearest-neighbors (von Neu-
mann neighborhood), whereas Nowak and May included next-nearest neighbor
interactions (Moore neighborhood). To check that the size of the neighbor-
hood does not change our conclusions, we have carried out simulations with
the Moore neighborhood, the results being depicted in Fig. 5. In fact, we have
reproduced the simulations reported by Nowak and May [1992], which do not
correspond exactly to a Moore neighborhood in so far as every player plays
also with herself, i.e., it is an 8+1 neighborhood. As we may see from the ex-
ample in the figure, we again find much lower levels of cooperation than in the
pure imitator case, irrespective of whether the learning rules themselves evolve
(right panels) or not (left panels). We note that this is not a general feature,
as striking differences have been found between the presence and the absence
of next-nearest-neighbor interactions, which makes our conclusion even more
relevant as it is not trivial. We thus see that indeed the existence of different
update rules in the population hinders cooperation on the square lattice.
5.2 Asynchronous updating
Although it is beyond our purposes to go into an exhaustive study of asyn-
chronicity, we think that providing at least some examples of that case will
increase the value and relevance of our results. To this end, we have run some
simulations in which every time step a single agent is chosen at random and
updates her strategy according to her current learning rule. Our results are
summarized in Fig. 6 for fixed update rules (left) and changing update rules
(right). We see from the plot that although there are a few quantitative dif-
ferences, particularly relevant for the competition between UI and MOR with
fixed update rules, the behavior is qualitatively the same in the synchronous
and the asynchronous updating schemes. It is thus clear that our conclusions
regarding the replacement of one rule by other are not an artifact of the syn-
chronous update.
6 Discussion
As we have already said, our goal in this work is to extract general conclu-
sions, and therefore we will now proceed to summarize the main results of our
experiments. We simulated three possible competitions, namely UI vs MOR,
UI vs REP, and REP vs. MOR, for both fixed and variable update rules, ex-
ploring the whole interval of temptation values as well as initial conditions
with different composition for each case. Our results are summarized in Fig.
7, where we can see that, generally speaking, the dominant update rule is
REP, in the sense that in most situations it dominates over the other rules
14
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Fig. 5. Mixed games with Moore neighbourhood and self-interaction (8+1 neigh-
bours), for fixed and variable rules and fC(0) = 0.50. Initial rule composition is half
and half for all cases.
even if its initial population is small. This is particularly so in the case of
REP vs MOR, for which the presence of MOR agents in the final population
is almost negligible even if the initial population contains only a 25% of REP
agents (see Fig. 7 bottom). The REP rule also dominates over the UI rule,
although in this case UI does not go fully extinct except for very small ranges
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Fig. 6. Mixed games with synchronous (thick, dashed line) and asynchrounous (thin,
solid line) update, for fixed and variable rules and fC(0) = 0.50. Initial rule com-
position is half and half for all cases.
of parameters, and, in turn UI prevails over MOR, again without driving it
to extinction. This is also shown in the asymptotic cooperation levels (Fig.
7, left panels): when the population is a mixture of REP with either UI or
MOR, the dependence of the cooperation level on b is similar to that of a full
REP population, with some influence of the other rule (e.g., the abrupt drops
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in cooperation at certain values of b when the mixed population consists of
REP and UI agents). A remarkable feature is that, when the population is a
combination of UI and MOR agents, there is a range of values of b, between
1.25 and 1.5 (and up to 2, depending on the initial concentration of imitators),
for which the cooperation level is larger than for imitators, but for parameter
values and populations other than this case, the cooperation level is smaller
than that reached in a full UI population. This result suggests that the good
behavior observed on lattices and other networks homogeneous in degree when
the agents are of the UI type may not be very robust to perturbations arising
from agents learning with other rules. In any event, it is clear that the lat-
tices with mixed populations do support cooperative states, which is a most
important difference with the well-mixed population case discussed in Sec. 3.
Regarding the prevalence of REP, we believe that it is a consequence of its
own dynamic mechanism, that has a built-in tendency to avoid changing its
rule relative to the other dynamics tested in this work. Indeed, if we com-
pare the definitions of the three dynamics, we notice that UI agents always
updates its strategy (and consequently its update rule), excepting when the
other agent has less or equal payoff; MOR agents have a set of probabilities
that will always trigger the rule updating, unless all probabilities are zero, as
in the very particular case of zero payoff for all neighbours (for example, in a
defector-only population). Otherwise also the MOR agents update their rule
with large probability, even adopting another rule with less payoff, leading to
the preservation of a rule that performed poorer; and, finally, a REP agent
randomly chooses a neighbour, and then assigns a probability to adopt its rule
proportional to the payoff difference between both agents. For this rule there
is only one possibility for having certainty of the rule update, and this is the
case where all neighbours are defectors fully surrounded by cooperators, and
the updating agent is a cooperator, in turn fully surrounded by defectors (in
a chessboard-like fashion). In this case we have certainty because of our nor-
malization factor for the probability, but it could even be the case that larger
normalisation factors were used, which would lead to a large but smaller than
1 probability to change.
With this in mind, we monitored the fraction of agents of rule A (B) that
update their rule relative to the total population having rule A (B), in each
generation, called ξA (ξB). As an illustration of the observed behaviours, in
Fig. 8 we plot this quantity for the same case as Fig. 3 (bottom panel), i.e.,
UI vs MOR agents. The fraction of changing Moran agents rapidly becomes
higher than that of imitators, and before 100 time steps is (and remains)
much higher. We repeated this observation for many other cases as well and,
in general, our results confirm that, in most cases, REP agents change their
strategy and update rule much less frequently in comparison to the other
dynamics. In some cases, this difference may be an order of magnitude smaller
for the replicator rule. On the other hand the rule that updates the most is the
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Fig. 7. Asymptotic fraction of cooperators (left) and of players with a given learning
rule (right) for different initial concentrations of that rule for the cases UI vs REP
(top), UI vs MOR (middle) and REP vs MOR (bottom). Thick solid lines, initial
condition with a 100% of players of the first rule; thin lines correspond to mixed
populations: solid, 75%, dotted, 50% and dashed, 25%, always of the first rule.
Finally, thick dashed lines correspond to pure populations with a 100% of the second
rule. All quantities are averages of over 5 realisations.
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Fig. 8. Rate of change of imitator ξUI and Moran ξMOR agents, relative to their
own population. Parameters are the same as Fig. 3 (bottom panel). Moran agents
change most of the time at a higher rate than imitators (note the logarithmic scale
in time).
Moran dynamics. Once again, this is consistent with our results: Most times,
MOR agents disappear completely when confronting REP agents, and they
survive in a restricted interval 1 < b < 1.1 against UI, never being more than
half of the final population (see Fig. 4, thin solid line), whereas for 4
3
< b < 3
2
their presence is solely due to finite size effects. For UI vs REP, imitators
change their rule more frequently, and replicators appear to be systematically
the major part of the population.
In order to further investigate the hypothesis that the fraction of changing
agents determine their prevalence, we deviced the following experiment: We
performed simulations with a similar setup as before, but in this case one of
the populations updates their strategies and rules only at times t = nτ , with
n = 0, 1, 2 . . ., being τ fixed (these would be “slow” agents). In this respect, it
is interesting to recall that a few recent works have proposed that the existence
of two types of agents, one of them with a smaller capability to transfer its
strategy, may promote cooperation [Szolnoki et al., 2007, 2008; ?]. Results of
applying this two-time scale setup to our simulation are collected in Fig. 9,
where we see an example for normal REP agents against slow MOR agents.
These results confirm our hypothesis: With τ = 101, replicators prevail as
usual (top panel), whereas for a sufficiently high update time, τ = 102, MOR
agents prosper, and replicators tend to become extint (bottom panel).
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Fig. 9. Normal replicator versus slow Moran agents, for different values of the
parameter τ . Temptation parameter is b = 1.2 and fREP (0) = 0.5. Top panel:
For τ = 10 evolution of the cooperator density. Replicators (solid line) outperform
Moran agents (dashed line), as in the normal (τ = 1) case. Bottom panel: For
τ = 102 the opposite happens.
However, while this is an appealing mechanism, it cannot be the only respon-
sible for the prevalence of strategies. To show it, we considered the situation
where agents of the same kind are put together, the inhomogeneity being only
that they can be “normal” or “slow”, i.e., that there is one fraction with a dif-
ferent τ . In Fig. 10 we show the result of normal UI vs slow UI (see parameters
in caption), where we observe that for all values of the temptation parameter
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b, there is still a fraction of normal agents. If our hypothesis above were the
only reason for the survival of one strategy, the result should be that slow UI
would always take over the entire population, but this is clearly not the case.
Indeed, normal agents do not dissapear, and they only decrease in frequency
noticeably (to fUI ≈ 0.2) in the interval
4
3
< b < 3
2
. We obtained similar results
for a wide range of τ , up to τ = 103. This indicates that, at least for agents
of the same type, the overall rule selection mechanism is not straightforward
and should be further studied, and we believe that the conclusions would also
carry over to the two update rule case. In addition, this makes clear that
the two-learning rule model is a scenario that goes beyond that proposed by
Szolnoki et al. [2007, 2008] and ? and therefore deserves further attention to
be completely understood.
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Fig. 10. Fraction of slow imitator agents fUI∗ (thick solid line) as a function of the
temptation parameter b. For comparison, we show also the total cooperation fraction
fC (thin solid line) and the homogeneous (i.e., all agents with τ = 1) cooperator
frequency (thin dashed line). Initial fraction of slow agents is fUI∗(0) = 0.50 and
τUI∗ = 10
2.
A last point we want to remark from a general viewpoint is the following.
Within our simulation procedure, a population composed only by defectors do
not interact. Indeed, in this case the only available payoff is P = 0 independent
of the agent’s update rule. REP or UI will not update their rule (they do so
only with more successful neighbours), and MOR agents build a set of zero
probabilities, thus keeping their rule as well. Thus, irrespective of the rules,
the system remains in a “frozen” state, with no further evolution. A similar
situation is found with a population composed only by cooperative imitators
and replicators. In this case, all agents receive R = 1 and thus have the same
payoff. Therefore, there is no rule update, and the system is, too, in a frozen
state. On the other hand, this is not the case when any of these rules are set
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against the Moran rule, where evolution does occur, and in most cases Moran
players disappear. While all these are direct consequences of the design of our
simulation, we have also found an interesting result regarding these locked
situations, where no evolution is possible, namely that the presence of a small
amount of a third type of agent may lead to evolution and, moreover, to a
completely different state. Indeed, when these few agents can interact with
at least one of the other type of (otherwise frozen) players, the system as a
whole may evolve, even with the possibility of the extinction of one or more
species, that otherwise would be present. We have not studied in detail this
three update rule scenarios, but we envisage that the dynamics will be much
richer and therefore deserves an in-depth analysis which is beyond the scope
of the present paper.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a first attempt to provide an evolutionary ra-
tionale for the update rules used in spatially distributed models of emergence
of cooperation. This is a key aspect of these models in so far as the choice of
update rule largely influences the appearance and stabilisation of cooperation.
In this context, our work must be viewed as a proposal for a general mech-
anism that would allow modellers to decide upon the rule of application in
specific contexts. The main ingredient of this mechanism is the evolvability of
update rules according to the same scheme as the strategies themselves, i.e.,
when an agent looks at her neighborhood and decides to copy the strategy
of another agent, she also copies the agent’s update rule. In this respect, we
want to stress that a related approach was proposed by Harley [1981] as a ra-
tionale to explain how populations can learn the evolutionary stable strategy.
His results, which involve strategies with memory and referred to accumulated
payoff, relate the stability of learning rules to their ability to take the popula-
tion to the evolutionary stable strategy. Although our proposal here is quite
different, in particular because our focus is not reaching an equilibrium but
rather letting the system evolve at will, it is only fair to acknowledge Harley’s
pioneering work in proposing the evolvability of strategies. On the other hand,
our model, much as Harley’s procedure, can be interpreted as learning in social
contexts, and hence it has in turn a much more biological character than en-
dogenous learning rules such as those introduced by Kirchkamp [1999], that, to
our knowledge, is the only other study where a evolutionary origin of learning
rules has been explored. Note, however, that Kirchkamp [1999] considered a
variety of games, while here we focus on the Prisoner’s Dilemma in view of its
applicability in a number of social, biological and even biochemical systems.
Finally, it is worth mentioning recent work by Szabo´ et al. [2008], where Dar-
winian selection is applied to a one-parameter stochastic update rule (similar
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to those used by Szolnoki et al. [2007, 2008]), leading to the selection of a
specific value of the parameter. This work is not related to ours in the update
rule they use but the spirit is quite the same.
Beyond this general statement of the importance of the idea of evolvability
of learning rules and its role to decide which ones should be used, we have
reached several important conclusions of our work, that to our knowledge
have never been reported elsewhere. In fact, their relevance arises not only for
their own sake but also because they affect to two of the most often employed
learning rules (UI and REP, see Szabo´ and Fa´th [2007]) and because among
the three rules we consider we cover the options local-global and deterministic-
stochastic. Our main findings can thus be summarized as follows:
• A well-mixed population playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma evolves to full de-
fection when individuals have two learning strategies, even if these learning
strategies can in turn evolve. Section 3 provides an example for replicators
vs imitators but other combinations can be worked out in a similar manner.
• When the population is placed on a square lattice, the existence of individ-
uals with two different, permanent learning rules leads to dramatic changes
with respect to the separate cases of the two strategies. Using again the
example of replicators vs imitators (Subsection 4.1), a small proportion of
replicators may lead to the breakdown of cooperation generically observed
for imitators [Nowak and May, 1992].
• Evolvability of learning rules has crucial implications on the outcome of
evolutionary game dynamics. Thus, Subsection 4.2 shows that replicator
displaces imitators leading to a rapid decreasing of cooperation. In turn,
imitators take over the fraction of global but stochastic imitators (MOR)
and lead to a promotion of the cooperative behavior. The phenomenon,
however, is not trivial, and regions where evolution leads to an outcome
opposite to what is expected in general are also observed (e.g., Fig. 4, 1.25 <
b < 4/3).
• This competition process takes place on lattices under different environ-
ments. Section 5 shows that our results are robust against changes on the
neighborhood considered (Moore instead of von Neumann) and against
asynchronous dynamics. This indicates that our conclusions have a large
degree of generality.
• We have shown that, in general, rules that lead to less frequent strategy
changes (and consequently to their own update in our model) tend to be
selected, although our simulations also prove that this is not the whole story
(Section 6).
• Finally, as a general conclusion, our work makes it clear that modelling the
emergence of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma on networks must go
beyond the work done so far in terms of populations with a single, constant
in time learning strategy. While by no means have we considered all possible
rules or all possible networks, our simulations provide well-established evi-
23
dence that the presence of different learning rules and their own evolution
may lead to unexpected phenomena, sometimes opposite to the observa-
tions available so far on unique-learning dynamics. Games with even more
delicate equilibria structure such as Snowdrift or Stag-Hunt are likely to be
affected in yet a stronger manner.
As a closing remark, we want to stress that, while we acknowledge the lim-
ited scope of the present report, we believe that our study opens the way
to a much more complete analysis of the evolution of the update rules. It is
clear that the present work asks for further research, regarding, e.g., the case
in which three different update rules are present simultaneously. As we have
advanced above, in this scenario much more complicated process may appear
as the third rule helps other resist invasion by a dominant one. On the other
hand, we have by no means exhausted the possible update rules, and a more
thorough simulation program which would include more deterministic local
rules is needed, in order to determine whether or not local rules invade global
rules, or whether stochastic is better than deterministic. A specific case of rel-
evance in social networks is that of reinforcement learning [Wang et al., 2008],
which is much more complex than the rules considered here and might provide
an interesting first step to extend our results to more realistic situations. It
would also be interesting to consider different time scales for the update of
strategies and the update of learning rules. Thus, it is conceivable that an
agent only changes her update rule after copying the strategy of the same
neighbour a certain number of times. Mutations in the learning rule can also
be included, and even heterogeneity in the details of the rule (for instance,
different proportionality factors in the REP rule). These and other extensions
of the present work should include in addition the comparison of the results
of different games beyond the PD. We envisage that such a programme would
be extremely useful for clarifying the big picture of evolutionary game theory
on graphs and its applications.
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